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7. The Tawney Decision
Meaningless Words and Post-Production Costs
Barry L. Wertz
McGinnis, Lochridge & Kilgore, L.L.P.
Houston, Texas
Overview
A wise man once said that only law professors qualify as trained
commentators on the law, except that practitioners with forty (40) or
more years of oil and gas practice are occasionally permitted to
comment, but not to profess.' Having reached 41 years of that practice, I
declare myself as qualified, but not trained, to comment on one aspect of
the perennial balles over post-production costs. More particularly, I
want to discuss "the marketable product" or "first marketable product
rule,"2 dealing with how post-production costs are treated in the
calculation of royalties. My topic is further narrowed primarily to price,
value or proceeds "at the well," "at the wellhead" or "at the mouth of the
well" and similar royalty provisions which do not contain detailed
wording on how to handle post-production costs.
The primary vehicles for this commentary are two marketable
product rule cases decided by the West Virginia Supreme Court. The first
is Wellman v. Energy Resources, Inc., decided in 2001.' The second is
The Estate of Tawney v. Columbia Natural Resources, decided in 2006.4
The Tawney case is currently on appeal to the West Virginia Supreme
Court following an earlier remand. This paper also contains discussions
of selected Kansas, Oklahoma and Colorado decisions that undoubtedly
influenced the West Virginia Supreme Court's adoption of a version of a
marketable product rule.
Most of my career has been spent representing mineral lessees,
including both litigation and counseling. However, I fully appreciate that
over the long haul both lessors and lessees prosper most when the terms
of their lease contracts are respected and enforced by the courts as
written. Temporary advantages to lessors or lessees because of judicial
excursions beyond the proper meaning of the terms of the lease bring
some short term elation to the "winning" side. In the long term, however,
I Patrick Martin, I rained commentator, professor and practitioner.
2 Although there is no single "marketable product rule," "first marketable product
rule" or "marketable condition rule," for convenience hereinafter, reference is often made
to) the "marketable product rule." Different versions of the "rule" are also discussed in
this paper.
557 S.E.2d 254 (W. Va. 2001).
4 633 S.E.2d 22 (V.Va. 2006).
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sanctity of contract is one of the most important features of this nation's
economic success.
Having hoisted the flag, however, I am compelled to disclose now
that I harbor at least an intellectual hostility to the marketable product or
marketable condition rules of royalty law that have sprung up in the last
10 to 15, years primarily in Kansas, Oklahoma, Colorado and, most
recently in West Virginia. Unlike the talking heads on TV covering the
presidential primaries who profess complete neutrality with respect to the
candidates, I do have "a dog in this hunt." In the main, I believe that in
formulating the marketable product rule, some courts have frequently
misused their jurisdiction's contract construction rules, have effectively
read out of leases terms like "at the well" and "at the mouth of the well"
and have declared unambiguous provisions to be ambiguous. These
courts have then imported into the royalty provision of the lease some
species of implied marketing covenant or duty by means of which the
economic bargain between lessor and lessee is rewritten to provide what
well intentioned courts believe is the best result for the parties.
This goal-oriented approach has required some nifty mental
gymnastics by courts in order to deal with the meanings of terms like
"production" and "post-production costs" "at the well" and "at the
wellhead." In more than a few cases this approach has lead to an
egregious disregard of long established meanings of oil and gas terms.
"Production" has become an elastic term, stretched far beyond the well
and beyond cessation of the extraction activities. These courts have used
findings of ambiguity and silence as springboards to invoke various
versions of implied marketing covenants to determine the rights of the
parties. The impacts of these goal-oriented opinions have profoundly
affected the royalty rights and obligations under tens of thousands of
leases from which oil and/or gas have been produced and yielded
royalties for many, many decades.
A few statements regarding what this paper and presentation are not
about might be useful. This is not a "soup-to-nuts" history and/or
analysis of the marketable product rule or of how post-production costs
are dealt with in all states. Numerous excellent papers have already been
published which provide extensive history and analysis. Possibly the
most comprehensive is an article published in 2005 in the St. Mary 's Law
Review.5 For the convenience of Institute participants, a fairly extensive
bibliography is appended as a ready resource for further exploration of
this topic.
Louisiana and Texas courts have not succumbed to the pressures
from certain sources to adopt some version of a marketable product rule.
s Brian C. Keeling & Karolyn King Gillespie, The First Marketable Product
Doctrine: Just What Is the "Product"?, 37 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1 (2005).
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Hopefully, they never will. I hope, however, you will find this paper and
presentation useful in your practice because of what we can learn from
how the courts in some other states are dealing with post-production cost
issues. Also, I am sure that many of you have clients (royalty owners and
lessees) who art: doing business in both marketable product rule and non-
marketable procuct rule jurisdictions.
I. The Issues Presented to the
West Virginia Supreme Court in Tawney
Ir Tawney, the circuit court certified (trial court) two (2) questions
to the West Virginia Supreme Court.
(a) Where the royalty language is as set out in Exhibit A [see
below], may a lessee of oil and gas in West Virginia deduct money
and/or volume from the lessor's 1/8 royalty payments for post-
production expenses, where the lease does not provide specifically
that the lessee may take such deductions from the royalty?6
(b) Where in an oil and gas lease there is no specific provision
allowing fror deduction of post-production expenses[,] does
language such as "wholesale market at the well," "amount
realized at the well," "net revenue realized," "1/8 of price," "net
of all costs beyond the wellhead," and other language as set forth
in Exhibit A, grant to the lessee the right to deduct post-
production expenses from the lessor's royalty (assuming for
purposes of this question that such expenses were reasonable and
actually incurred)?7
The West Virginia Supreme Court reformulated the two questions
into one as follows.
In light of the fact that West Virginia recognizes that a lessee to
an oil and gas lease must bear all costs incurred in marketing
and transporting the product to the point of sale unless the oil
and gas lease provides otherwise, is lease language that provides
that the lessor's 1/8 royalty is to be calculated "at the well," "at the
wellhead" or similar language, or that the royalty is "an amount
equal to 1/3 of the price, net all costs beyond the "wellhead," or
"less all taxes, assessments, and adjustments" sufficient to indicate
that the lessee may deduct post-production expenses from the
lessor's 1/4 royalty, F resuming that such expenses are reasonable
and actually incurred?
6 Tawney, 633 5.E.2d at 25 n. 2 (emphasis added).
7 Id. (emphasis added).
8 Id. at 24-25 (emphasis added).
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These questions from Tawney provide an excellent background and
context for the discussions which follow, and which lead to the detailed
analysis of the Tawney decision.
II. Brief Summary of Selected Marketable
Product Rule Cases in Oklahoma, Kansas and Colorado
An excellent source of information on the development of the first
marketable product rule in Kansas is the 1995 Kansas Supreme Court
decision in Sternberger v. Marathon Qil Co.9 This was a class action gas
royalty case involving both Kansas and non-Kansas plaintiffs, with
royalty and overriding royalty interests in oil and gas leases located in
Kansas, Oklahoma, Texas, Louisiana, Utah and Colorado. Only the
Kansas, Texas and Oklahoma leases are involved in the appeal to the
Kansas Supreme Court.
The issue of interest here is Marathon's predecessor's deduction
from the royalties marketing costs or.- gathering line amortization
expenses to recover a portion of its expenses in constructing and
maintaining gas gathering pipeline systems to transport gas from the
lease to market off the lease. The trial court declared Marathon's
deductions improper and Marathon appealed.
There was no market for the gas at the wellhead and after gathering
gas from the individual wells, the gas was transported downstream to the
purchaser. The royalty provision of the class representative provided
that:
"[t]o pay lessor for gas of whatsoever nature or kind produced and
sold, or used off the premises, or used in the manufacture of any
products therefrom, one-eighth (1/8), at the market price at the
well, (but, as to gas sold by lessee, in no event more than one-eighth
(1/8) of the proceeds received by lessee from such sales), for the gas
sold, used off the premises, or in the manufacture of products
therefrom, said payments to be made monthly."o
The Kansas Supreme Court interpreted this provision as being "silent as
to deductions." In other words, the "at the well" wording meant
absolutely nothing to the court in terms of post-production cost
allocation.
After detailed discussion of previous Kansas cases relating to post-
production costs issue, the court addressed the marketable product
concept, citing with approval a 1994 Colorado case, Garman v. Conoco,
Inc.," the court stated that:
9 894 P.2d 788 (Kan. 1995).
10 Id. at 792 (emphasis added).
" 886 P.2d 652 (Colo. 1994).
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That case involved a certified federal question. In it, the Colorado
Supreme Court held as we believe the law in Kansas to be: Once a
marketable product is obtained, reasonable costs incurred to
transport or enhance the value of the marketable gas may be charged
against nonworking interest owners. The lessee has the burden of
proving the reasonableness of the costs. Absent a contract providing
to the contrary, a nonworking interest owner is not obligated to bear
any share of production expense, such as compressing, transporting,
and processing, undertaken to transform gas into a marketable
product. In the case before us, the gas is marketable at the well. The
problem is there is no market at the well, and in that instance we
hold the lessor must bear a proportionate share of the reasonable
cost of transporting the marketable gas to its point of sale.'
The requirement that the gas must first be in marketable condition before
any post-production costs can b.e deducted trumps the "at the well" lease
language.
Colorado i. a very "friendly" marketable product rule jurisdiction.
The leading Colorado case is Rogers v. Westerman Farm Company.'3 In
the opinion conclusion the Colorado Supreme Court "laid down the law"
with particularity as follows.
First, the court focused on the "at the well" and "at the mouth of the
well" wording which the lessee insisted clearly demonstrated the
intention of the parties to allocate post-production costs. The court
responded:
After asseising the "at the well" and "at the mouth of the well"
language in this case, we conclude that the leases at issue here are
silent with respect to the allocation of costs. Moreover, we decline
to adopt the rule that the "at the well" language in the leases
allocates transportation costs, while being silent as to other costs.
Because we have determined that the leases are silent with respect
to allocation of costs, we look to the implied covenant to market
to determine the proper allocation of costs.14
Having rejccted the "at the well" and "at the mouth of the well"
wording as SILENT with respect to the allocation of post-production
costs, the court resorted to that contract construction tool all too often the
cause of mischief - the implied covenant to market - to forge the
Colorado first-n-arketable product rule.
Under the implied covenant to market, the lessees have a duty to
make the gas marketable. In analyzing that duty, we look to the
- 243 -
12 Id. at 800.
13 29 P.3d 887 (Colo. 2001).
14 Id. at 912 (emphasis added).
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first-marketable product rule as guidance and adopt a definition of
marketability to include both a physical condition such that the gas
would be acceptable for sale in a commercial market, and a
location-based assessment, such that it would be saleable in a
commercial marketplace. The determination as to when gas is
marketable is a question of fact. Once a determination is made that
gas is marketable, costs can be allocated accordingly. Costs incurred
to make the gas marketable are, to be borne solely by the lessees.
Alternatively, costs incurred subsequent to the gas being marketable
are to be shared proportionately between the lessee and the lessors.
Finally, we decline to adopt the court of appeals' view that the gas
was marketable as a matter of law, and that the costs were properly
deductible by the lessees as a result of such a conclusion."
A 2007 decision by a Colorado appellate court applied the Rogers
decision to a dispute which included, inter alia, the royalty owner's
claim that the producer underpaid gas royalties by "improperly deducting
the cost of gathering, processing, and transporting the gas to the
commercial marketplace from the royalty payment.16
After reviewing the major pronouncements of the Colorado
Supreme Court in Rogers, the Clough court repeated the definition of
marketability.
Once gas is marketable, the supreme court concluded, the allocation
of costs between the working interest owner and the royalty interest
owner can be determined. The working interest owner must bear the
costs of getting the gas to a marketable condition and marketable
location, but once the gas is marketable, additional costs to improve
or transport the gas must be shared proportionately between the
working interest owner and the royalty interest owner. Rogers v.
Westerman Farm Co., supra.17
One appeal point in this case was whether the plaintiff royalty
owner was entitled to an instruction that the "at the well" royalty
provision was silent about the allocation of costs. The trial court
refused to give the requested instruction. This court held that since
Rogers resolved that issue as a matter of law, there was no need for the
instruction. The appellate court further stated:
Here, the jury was given all the necessary instructions, including an
explanation of the implied duty to market gas; the working interest
owner's obligations under this implied duty; the definition of a
market; the test for marketability; and the working interest owner's
15 Id. There is more discussion of Rogers in Section VI hereinafter.
16 Clough v. Williams Production Company, 2007 WL 416119, p. 5 (Colo. App.).
17 Id at 7.
- 244 -
6
Annual Institute on Mineral Law, Vol. 55 [2008], Art. 11
https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/mli_proceedings/vol55/iss1/11
entitlement to take deductions from royalties for costs incurred after
the gas has become marketable."8
Under the Colorado cases, whether, when and where gas becomes
marketable are questions of fact. 19
The Okhhoma Supreme Court has adopted and modified over time
a marketable condition or marketable product rule which is thoroughly
discussed in the court's 1998 decision Mittelstaedt v. Santa Fe Minerals,
Inc.20 The Mitelstaedt opinion followed two earlier opinions of the court
that were crit.cized by many as overly harsh to the interests of lessees,
Wood v. TXO Production Corporation21 and TXO Production Corp. v.
State of Oklahoma, ex rel, Commissioners of the Land Office, et al.22
The primary facts involved in the case made the subject of this
opinion are that the lessee made deductions "from the royalty interest
paid to the lessors" for transportation, compression, dehydration, and
blending cost,. The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
certified to the Oklahoma Supreme Court the question whether such
deductions were proper under a "gross proceeds" lease. The certified
question was framed as follows:
In light of the facts as detailed below, is an oil and gas lessee who is
obligated to pay "3/16 of the gross proceeds received for the gas
sold" entitled to deduct a proportional share of transportation,
compression, dehydration, and blending costs from the royalty
interest paid to the lessor?23
The court recounted the development of the marketable condition
rule in Oklahoma, specifically referencing Wood, TXO Production Corp.
and Johnson v. Jernigan.2 4 These three decisions provide considerable
insight regarding as to how Oklahoma became a marketable condition
jurisdiction, including use of an implied marketing obligation as a
primary basis of the rule. Further, a careful reading of the opinions of the
Supreme Couit in Wood and TXO Production Corp. helps to explain the
deeply divided Mittelstaedt court.25
18 Id. at 11.
19 Savage v. Williams Prod RMT Co., 140 P.3d 67, 69-72 (Colo. App. 2005); Rogers
v. Westerman Farm Company, 29 P.3d 887 (Colo. 2001).
20 954 P.2d 1203 (Okla. 1998).
21 854 P.2d 880 (Okla. 1992).
22 903 P.2d 2!;9 (Okla. 1994).
23 Mittelstaed' at 1204.
24 475 P.2d 396 (Okla. 1970).
25 Three justices concurred in part and dissented in part and three justices dissented in
part.
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The Mittelstaedt court summarized its answer to the certified
question as follows:
In sum, a royalty interest may bear post-production costs of
transporting, blending, compression, and dehydration, when the
costs are reasonable, when actual royalty revenues increase in
proportion to the costs assessed against the royalty interest, when
the costs are associated with transforming an already marketable
product into an enhanced product, and when the lessee meets its
burden of showing these facts. 6
The court further described its version of the marketable product rule.
We conclude that this clause, when considered by itself, prohibits a
lessee from deducting a proportionate share of transportation,
compression, dehydration, and blending costs when such costs are
associated with creating a marketable product. However, we
conclude that the lessor must bear a proportionate share of such
costs if the lessee can show (1) that the costs enhanced the value of
an already marketable product, (2) that such costs are reasonable,
and (3) that actual royalty revenues increased in proportion with the
costs assessment against the nonworking interest. Thus, in some
cases a royalty interest may be burdened with post-production costs,
and in other cases it may not.27
The Mittelstaedt court generally places on the lessee the burden of
proving that it has met the three qualifying conditions.
III. Some Important Terminology
By way of further background, it is instructive to consider the
meanings ascribed to certain oil and gas terms by the marketable product
rule courts. These terms include "marketable condition," "marketable
product," "production," "deduction from what," "allocation" of post-
production costs, "at the well" and "at the wellhead." All of these terms
are implicated in the commonly litigated fact situation: (i) the gas royalty
clause provides for royalties based upon values or prices "at the well" or
"at the wellhead;" (ii) there is no market for the gas at the well or
wellhead; (iii) downstream of the well or wellhead costs for gathering,
compressing, treating, sometimes processing and transportation are
incurred before the gas is delivered to the pipeline company at the
location where the gas is sold; the distances of the points of the sale from
the wellhead vary greatly; and (iv) sometimes these costs represent a
substantial portion of the sales price to the pipeline.
26 Id. at 1204.
27 Id. at 1205.
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For purposes of exploring the importance of the above-referenced
terminology, assume that the operative wording in the lease royalty
provision is as follows;
The royalty on gas shall be an amount equal to 1/6 of the price, net
of all costs beyond the wellhead.
Assume further that there are no other lease provisions which discuss
post-production costs and how, if at all, those costs are to be dealt with in
calculation of I he royalties payable to the royalty owner.
Finally, assume that the marketable product rule to be applied is
stated as follows:
The only post-production costs deductible for gas royalty
calculation purposes are those incurred after the lessee has achieved
a marketable product.
While this ariculation is quite basic, it is adequate to explore the
meanings attributed to the terminology.
A. When Does Production End?
If the subject is "post-production costs," it is logical that the
threshold determinations are what is meant by the term "production" and
when does the production process end. Until marketable product
doctrines began to take hold, in most jurisdictions the oil and gas
engineers and the courts answered these two questions in essentially the
same ways.
As participants in the oil and gas industry, you are probably
confident that you know what is meant by the term "production" as that
term has beer. used for royalty determination purposes in Louisiana,
Texas, Colorado, Kansas, Oklahoma and many other jurisdictions far
back into the last century. It has long been widely understood in the
industry that fbr royalty determination purposes, production ends at the
wellhead.211 One of the frequently used definitions of "production" in
industry circles is that production ends when the oil and/or gas are
reduced to possession of the operator at the surface.29 One commentator
explains that ":l]ittle dispute has arisen under the oil royalty clause as to
when oil or gas is produced .. .for purposes of the oil royalty clause,
production normally means the act of severing the hydrocarbons from the
ground."30 Accepting these commonly used industry definitions, most
28 See, e.g., Riley v. Merriwether, 780 S.W.2d 919, 923 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1989,
writ denied) (stating that production of a well involves actually taking oil or gas from the
well in a captive state for either storing or marketing the product for sale) citing 3
HowARD R. WILLIAMS & CHARLES J. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW §631 at 395 (1989);
Bruce K. Kramer-, Interpreting the Royalty Obligation By Looking at the Express
Language: What A Novel Idea, 35 TEx. TECH L. REv. 223, 234 (2004).
29 Riley, 780 S.W.2d at 923.
30 Kramer; supra, note 19 at 234.
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folks in the oil and gas industry have had no difficulty in deciding when
production activities end and post-production activities begin for royalty
determination purposes. The "well," "wellhead" and "mouth of the well"
terms provide a clear and unambiguous location of the end of
"production."
That confidence in understanding of the meaning of the term
"production" for royalty determination purposes is confirmed by many
court decisions and state statutory laws and regulations. For example, the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has stated that "[i]n the interests of
consistency, logic, and economics, (the] court adopts as the legal
definition of the word 'production,' as used in the context of calculating
royalty payments, the actual physical severance of minerals from the
formation."3' The court then cited numerous cases from various courts,
including the Supreme Court of the United States, which had given
consistent or even identical definitions of the term "production."32
It is generally accepted in the oil and gas industry and in most
judicial jurisdictions that "production" ends upon severance of the
mineral from the ground, not at some uncertain point downstream of the
well. This generally accepted definition of "production" is not
conditioned on whether or not a marketable product exists or how a
"marketable product" is created or defined. This definition does not rely
upon any implied covenant to market gas, nor is there any reason for any
such reliance. This generally accepted definition means what it says-
"production" ends upon severance of the gas at the well by the lessee.
Now, enter the first marketable rule and marketable product rule
jurists, and suddenly the term "production" as it has been defined and
used in the oil and gas industry for over a century takes on some new
meaning for royalty determination purposes. The new meaning is not the
result of any change in the physical activities associated with severance
of the gas from the reservoir or of activities occurring downstream of the
wellhead separators. Rather, it has become one of the contract
interpretation tools used to eliminate the longstanding understanding that
31 Diamond Shamrock Exploration Co. v. Hodel, 853 F.2d 1159, 1168 (5th Cir. 1988).
32 Id. citing Interstate Natural Gas v. FPC, 331 U.S. 682, 690, 67 S.Ct. 1482, 1487,
91 L.Ed. 1742, 1748 (1947) (production involves a physical act); Energy Oils v. Montana
Power Co., 626 F.2d 731, 738 (9th Cir. 1980); Saturn Oil & Gas Co. v. FPC, 250 F.2d
61, 64 (10th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 956, 78 S.Ct. 542, 2 L.Ed.2d 532 (1958)
(act of bringing forth gas from the earth); Wyoming v. Pennzoil Co., 752 P.2d 975, 979
(Wyo. 1988) (production requires severance of mineral from ground); Exxon Corp. v.
Middleton, 613 S.W.2d 240, 244 (Tex. 1981) (requires extraction of gas); Monsanto Co.
v. Tyrrell, 537 S.W.2d 135, 137 (Tex.Civ.App. 1976) (actual physical severance);
Christian v. A.A.Oil Corp., 161 Mont. 420, 428, 506 P.2d 1369, 1373 (1973) (withdrawn
from land and reduced to possession); Continental Oil Co. v. Landry, 215 La. 518, 41
So.2d 73, 75 (1949) (requires extraction).
3 See supra notes 28 and 29 and accompanying text.
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Y"production" ends at the outlet of the well, and to justify ignoring the
plain meaning of the terms "at the well" and "at the wellhead" in the
context of post-production cost royalty considerations.
Professor Owen Anderson, one of the commentators who has
addressed the marketable product type rules and post-production costs in
several articles, tates that production of oil and gas does not end until a
marketable product is "produced" by the lessee.34 Professor Anderson
concludes that because royalty is a "share of production," royalty should
be calculated at the point that production ends-i.e., in his view, at the
point where therm is a marketable product."
With all due respect to Professor Anderson, royalty paid in money is
not actually a "share of production." Royalty in-kind is a share of
production. Under the "at the well" type royalty provisions being
considered here, the royalty owner does not own or receive any
production as his/her "royalty share." Upon severance, all of the gas is
owned by the lessee. The royalty owner is entitled to the amount of
money yielded by the proper application of the terms of the royalty
provision.
While describing the royalty as a "share of production" sounds
supportive of Professor Anderson's elastic concept of production, it is, at
best, a misnomer. However, Professor Anderson's "reasoning" can be
used by some to justify elimination of some or all of the post-production
costs as those costs have long been understood in the oil and gas
industry.
Some mark-,table product rule courts and commentators have relied
upon an expanded definition of "production" to justify adoption of such
rule. Such revisionist courts and commentators should pursue their goal
without changin: the meaning of such a fundamental lease and industry
term as "production" just to facilitate altering the bargain long struck
between royalty owners and lessees in terms of the payment of royalties.
If a marketable ,roduct rule is appropriate under given leases, it should
be so because. of credible evidence of the intention of the parties, not
because of redefining and/or extending the meaning of oil and gas terms
that already have well established meanings.
B. "Deductions From What"
Already this paper contains numerous references to "deduction" of
post-production costs "from the royalty" or from the "lessor's royalty."
3" Owen L. Anderson, Royalty Valuation: Should Royalty Obligations Be Determined
Intrinsically, Theortically, or Realistically? Part 2, 37 NAT. RESOURCES J. 611, 684
(1997). Professor Anderson has written extensively on the marketable product rule. See
also Owen L. Anderson, Royalty Valuation: Should Royalty Obligations Be Determined
Intrinsically, Theori tically, or Realistically? Part 1, 37 NAT. RESOURCEs J. 547 (1997).
3s See generally Anderson supra note 34.
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Some of those references have been highlighted for emphasis. In the two
questions certified to the Tawney court and the court's reformulation into
a single question, there are three (3) references to deduction of post-
production costs "from the royalty" or "from the lessor's royalty."
Unfortunately, loose and imprecise use of this terminology by many of
us in the oil and gas industry, and by many courts, adds to the
misperception of the true nature of the monetary royalty interest provided
for in the "at the wellhead" or "at the well" royalty provisions. Those of
us who have litigated post-production cost royalty cases have deposed
royalty owners who almost always (in my experience) have the same
explanation of what is deducted from what.
The royalty owner's explanation frequently goes something like
this. Step one - my royalty is 1/6 of the downstream sales price of the
gas - e.g., $1.00 per MMBtu where the gas is sold downstream for $6.00
per MMBtu. That is MY ROYALTY. Step two - the lessee deducts 1/6
of the $2.00 in post-production costs (i.e., 33 cents) FROM MY
ROYALTY. That REDUCES MY ROYALTY to $2.00 minus $0.33 or
$1.67 per MMBtu. Therefore, I GET LESS THAN MY FULL 1/6
ROYALTY.
It is not only the royalty owners who give this explanation of what
is deducted from what. In representing producers it is common to find
communications to the royalty owners from the producer's royalty
department similar to the following (without the emphasis):
Dear Ms. Jones:
This will confirm that the $1,006 DEDUCTIONS FROM
YOUR DECEMBER 2003 ROYALTY was for various post-
production costs ...
Sincerely,
Ms. Royalty Specialist
Dear Mr. Smith:
The reason we DEDUCTED $776.00 FROM YOUR
ROYALTY FOR MARCH 2000 is because your lease provides
that you are to be paid the price of the gas at the well.
Sincerely,
Mr. Royalty Manager
In preparing Mr. Royalty Manager and Ms. Royalty Specialist for
their depositions, they are often shocked when told that the royalty owner
contends the producer is taking back part of the royalty owed to the
royalty owner. Both Ms. Royalty Specialist and Mr. Royalty Manager
insist that the royalty fraction is not applied until the netback at the well
is calculated. Thus, none of the costs were ever included in the "royalty."
-250-
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They are absolutely right. However, it is a fair.reading of their letters as
saying exactly what the royalty owner said in her/his deposition
testimony, and will certainly say at trial.
When a lease provides for a royalty of "1/8 of the market price of
the gas at the well," the dollar amount of the 1/8 royalty does not come
into existence uniil after deduction of the post-production costs from the
downstream sales price. For example, if the downstream sales price is
$4.25 per MMBtu and the total amount of permitted deductions for post-
production costs is $1.00 per MMBtu, the price at the well is [$4.25 per
MMBtu] - [$1.OC per MMBtu] or $3.25 per MMBtu. When the $3.25 per
MMBtu36 figure has been multiplied by the royalty fraction, it yields the
dollar and cents amount of royalties per MMBtu. There has been no
deduction from the lessor's royalty. The lessor's royalty amount did not
come into existence until after the price at the well was established.
In my experience, royalty owners are totally unimpressed during
litigation when they are told that the lessee's royalty department
personnel simply used "loose wording" and/or that they didn't mean
what they said. Such documents create doubt on the part of the royalty
owners and sometimes the courts about the accuracy and/or truthfulness
of the lessee's explanation of its understanding of its royalty obligation
and, more particularly, of how post-production costs should be dealt with
in making royalty determinations. That doubt is also often readily created
in the minds of jurors, who expect the lessee's personnel to communicate
accurately with full understanding of the information contained in such
documents. Many jurors simply do not accept an employee's: "I really
didn't mean wh.t I wrote" explanation, even when it is a completely
truthful statemen:.
Throughout this presentation, references to deductions of post-
production costs mean deductions from the downstream sales price.
References to the wellhead price mean the price after deduction of the
post-production costs from the downstream sales price. It is that price to
which the royally fraction should be applied to calculate the royalty
payments. A shcrt-hand term for this royalty calculation component is
"Royalty Value" or "Royalty Price." The royalty fraction is multiplied by
the Royalty Value or Royalty Price to get the amount of the royalty
payment.
C. "At The Well" and "At The Wellhead"
I really dislike automobiles that talk to the driver. I especially
dislike those navigation systems which not only tell you how to proceed,
but also rebuke you when you don't follow instructions. Yet, I do
36 All numeric references to. gas prices and amounts of post-production costs are
expressed per MMBi.u. For purposes of simplicity, the MMBtu unit is frequently omitted
in this presentation.
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understand that some remote locations can be very difficult to find
without some extra-ordinary assistance. Some of the marketable product
rule opinions leave me with the impression that the courts need a super-
sophisticated "navigation system" to locate the "well" and the
"wellhead" in gas royalty provisions providing for royalty to be
calculated "at the well" or "at the wellhead."
To be sure, many things have changed in the oil and gas industry
since that oil boom in Titusville long ago. One has never needed a
satellite spying eye locator to find the "well" or the "wellhead" in any
onshore gas field, however. If one wishes to visit the Bubba Boudreaux
No. I well in a given field, one drives or walks out to the hunk of iron
with the sign saying "Bubba Boudreaux No. 1 Well." That is a fixed
location. It doesn't move.
When calculating royalty for Bubba Boudreaux for production from
the Bubba Boudreaux No. 1 Well under a lease providing that royalty on
gas shall be calculated "at the well" or "at the wellhead," the point for
calculating the dollar amount of royalty is no mystery. Or is it? As will
soon be discussed, there appears to be considerable mystery regarding
the "location of the well" or the meaning of the "at the well" wording. Of
course, what appears to be a mystery is nothing more than judicial
"logic" used to justify ignoring the plain meaning of the terms in
determining the intention of the parties to the lease.
D. Marketable Condition
Concepts of marketable condition of gas existed long before the
advent of the various species of marketable condition rules. Companies
which transport natural gas have always established qualitative
specifications for natural gas as a condition to taking the gas into their
pipelines for transportation to the first or further markets. Excessive
contaminants in the gas can cause great harm to the pipeline and
associated facilities. Purchasers of gas do not want to buy gas unfit for
resale or other use by them. The price paid for gas normally depends
upon the various components of the gas stream. All of these
considerations in a real sense are factored in the context of whether the
gas is marketable.
In marketable product rule jurisdictions "marketable condition"
frequently means something more than whether the gas is in a physical
condition such that there are persons and/or entities which are willing to
purchase the gas. One of the factors which distinguishes some
marketable product rules from others is how the courts define
"marketable condition."
Kansas is a marketable rule jurisdiction. Under Kansas law, gas can
be in "marketable condition" at the well even if there is no commercial
market at the well. The Kansas Supreme Court in its 1995 decision in
Sternberger v. Marathon Oil Co. held that where the gas is in marketable
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condition at the well and transportation is required to a commercial
market, the lessor must bear a portion of those transportation costs.3 In
Sternberger, the emphasis appears to be on the composition of the gas
stream.
Colorado is another marketable product rule jurisdiction. The
flagship Colorado case is Rogers v. Westerman Farm Co..38 The
producers in Rogers sought to make deductions through use of "netback"
or "workback" methods to establish a Royalty Price or Royalty Value "at
the well."
The Rogers Court defined marketable condition as follows:
In defining whether gas is marketable, there are two factors to
consider, condition and location. First, we must look to whether
the gas is in a marketable condition, that is, in the physical
condition whether it is acceptable to be bought and sold in a
commercial marketplace. Second, we must look to location, that is,
the commercial marketplace, to determine whether the gas is
commercially saleable in the oil and gas marketplace.
The Rogers court treats the issues of marketable condition and
marketable location as fact issues.
In the Mitteltaedt decision the Oklahoma Supreme Court defines
marketable condition as gas in terms of the physical condition of the
gas.40 It does not impose the location requirement in Rogers.
IV. West Virginia Contract Construction Rules
Any fair assessment of the West Virginia Supreme Court's adoption
of a marketable product rule is aided by consideration of the rules of
contract construction by which the court was to be guided. The following
contract construcltion rules were most relevant to the Wellman and
Tawney decisions.
a. A covenant will be implied in a contract only where the contract
contains no express provisions with regard to the subject matter of
the implied covenant.
b. Where contract terms are clear and unambiguous, they must be
applied by the court and not construed.42
3 Sternberger v. Marathon Oil Co., 894 P.2d 788, 800 (Kan. 1995).
3:1 Rogers v. Westeiman Farm Co., 29 P.3d 887 (Colo. 2001) (en banc).
3 Id. at 905 (emphasis added).
4 Mittelstaedt v. Snta Fe Minerals, Inc., 954 P.2d 1203, 1208 (Okla. 1998).
4 1 Croston v. Ema, Oil Co., 464 S.E.2d 728 (W. Va. 1995); Thompson Dev., Inc. v.
Kroger Co., 413 S.E.2d 137 (W. Va. 1991); DeStubner v. Microid Process, 21 S.E.2d
154 (W. Va. 1942); Berry v. Humphreys, 86 S.E. 569 (W. Va. 1915).
4! Syl. pt. 3, Wad4 ' v. Riggleman, 606 S.E. 2d 222 (W. Va. 2004); Syl. pt. 2, Orteza
v. Monongalio Couny General Hosp., 318 S.E.2d 40 (W. Va. 1984); Syl. Pt. 2,
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c. "An oil and gas lease which [sic] is clear in its provisions and
free from ambiguity, either latent or patent, should be considered on
the basis of its express provisions and it is not subject to a practical
construction by the parties."4 3
d. "It is not the right or province of the court to alter, pervert or
destroy the clear meaning and intent of parties as plainly expressed
in their written contract or to make a new and different contract for
them."44
e. It is a basic tenet of contract construction that each and every
word is to be given meaning, and that the court cannot create or
impose an implied covenant or construction that is inconsistent with
the express terms of the contract.45
f. Individual terms in a contract provision are not to be interpreted
separately, but are to be read together with all other words in that
46contract provision so that all words are given meaning.
g. "The term 'ambiguity' is defined as language 'reasonably
susceptible of two different meanings' or 'language of such doubtful
meaning that reasonable minds might be uncertain or disagree as to
its meaning'."4
h. "If it is found to be ambiguous, the rules applicable to that type
of instrument are used to ascertain the meaning of the parties and if
the instrument contains irreconcilable provisions the rules are
equally well established for determining the dominant intent in the
circumstances."48
i. "The question as to whether a contract is ambiguous is a
question of law to be determined by the court.A9
Bethleham Mines Corp. v. Haden, 172 S.E.2d 126 (W. Va. 1969).
43 Cotiga .Dev. Co. v. United Fuel Gas Co., 128 S.E.2d 626, 634 (W. Va. 1962)
(quoting Syl. pt. 3, Little Coal Land Co. v. Owens-Illinois Glass Co., 63 S.E.2d 528
(W.Va. 1951)).
" Id. at 633 (emphasis added) (citing Bischoff v. Francesca, 56 S.E.2d 865, 870 (W.
Va. 1949); Lange & Crist Box & Lumber Co. v. Haught, 52 S.E.2d 695, 699 (W. Va.
1949); Kanawha Banking & Trust Co. v. Gilbert, 46 S.E.2d 225, 236 (W. Va. 1947)).
4 Barn-Chestnut, Inc. v. CFMDev. Corp., 457 S.E.2d 502, 509 (W. Va. 1995).
4 See, e.g., Moore v. Johnson Serv. Co., 219 S.E.2d 315, 320 (W. Va. 1975);
Chambers v. Simmons, 85 S.E. 182, 184 (W. Va. 1915).
47 Payne v. Weston, 466 S.E.2d 161, 166 (W. Va. 1995) quoting Syl. Pt. 1, in part,
Shamblin v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 332 S.E.2d 639 (W. Va. 1985).
48 Lewis v. Dils Motor Co., 135 S.E.2d 597, 601-02 (W. Va. 1964).
49 Syl. Pt. 1, in part, Berkeley County Pub. Serv. Dist. V. Vitro Corp. of Am., 162
S.E.2d 189 (W. Va. 1968).
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j. "[T]he general rule as to oil and gas leases is that such contracts
will generally be liberally construed in favor of the lessor, and
strictly as against the lessee."50
k. "Where the meaning of a writing is uncertain and ambiguous,
parol evidence is admissible to show the situation of the parties,
surrounding circumstances when the writing was made, and the
practical construction given to the contract by the parties themselves
either contemporaneously or subsequently."5
We know that courts have considerable discretion in selecting and
applying the rule-s of contract construction they employ in resolving
contract disputes. The West Virginia Supreme Court is no exception.
This single reality has over time helped put droves of children of lawyers
through college, including my daughter and son, one of whom is a
lawyer. In the Wellman and Tawney decisions, the West Virginia
Supreme Court demonstrated its discretionary skills, and provided
wonderful opportunities for the children of many lawyers needing
college tuition funding as the West Virginia courts are likely to be called
upon repeatedly in the future to further explain and possibly develop
further its marketable product rule.
V. Wellman, on the way to Tawney
Tawney is the proverbial "second shoe" after the West Virginia
Supreme Court's 2001 decision in Wellman. While there are other issues
addressed in Wllman, comments here are limited to the Court's
construction of the following gas royalty provision:
... one-eighth (1/8) of the market value of such gas at the mouth of
the well; is [ifl such gas is sold by the Lessee, then as royalty one-
eighth (1/8) of the proceeds from the sale of gas as such at the
mouth of the well where s as, condensate, distillate or other
gaseous substance is found.
Stripped to their essentials, the critical facts included the above-
quoted royalty provision, a downstream sales price of $2.22, the amount
of post-production costs which the Defendant sought to deduct from the
downstream sales price was $1.35, the amount of the proceeds at "the
mouth of the welt" was $0.87.s Applying the 1/8 royalty fraction to the
$0.87 yields a royalty of $0.10875, or rounded to 10.9 cents per MMBtu.
!o Syl. Pt. 1, Martjn v. Consolidated Coal & Oil Corp., 133 S.E. 626 (W. Va. 1926).
M Syl. Pt. 4, Watson v. Buckhannon River Coal Co., 120 S.E. 390 (W. Va. 1923).
!,2 Wellman v. Erergy Resources, Inc., 557 S.E.2d 254, 257-58 (W. Va. 2001)
(emphasis added).
1 Id. at 263.
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The plaintiff royalty owner argued that no post-production costs
should be deducted from the downstream sales price.54 Thus, the royalty
per MMBtu should be determined by multiplying $2.22 by 1/8, which
yields a royalty of $0.2775, rounded to 28 cents per MMBtu. Using the
royalty owner's approach, she/he will receive 16.9 cents more per
MMBtu than by using the dollar amounts of the proceeds at the mouth of
the well as urged by the Defendant producer.
Could the Wellman Court have held that application of the royalty
provision as written requires making the royalty calculation by
multiplying the $2.22 MMBtu downstream sales price by the 1/8 royalty
fraction? Of course, the Court could hold anything. Such a holding,
however, would have been in irreconcilable conflict with the plain
meaning of the provision as written and with several of the rules of
contract construction already described.55 For example, the West
Virginia Supreme Court stated in its 1963 Davis v. Hardman opinion,
upon which the Wellman Court relies, in part, that:
In the construction of a deed or other legal instrument, the function
of the court is to ascertain the intent of the parties as expressed
in the language used by them.56
The words "proceeds from the sale of such gas at the mouth of the
well" where the "gas, condensate, distillate or other gaseous
substance is found" must be ignored to base the royalty owner's 1/8
royalty on the value at any location other than "at the mouth of the
well." It is extremely difficult to imagine how the Wellman Court could
be said to have complied with this rule set out in Davis and quoted
immediately above.
The Davis Court also discussed another rule of contract
construction:
All rules of construction must yield to be [the] expressed intention
of the parties if that can be ascertained."
It is equally difficult to conceive how the Wellman Court complied
with this rule. It is not only the point of royalty valuation that is readily
ascertainable-"at the mouth of the well." The proceeds at the mouth of
the well are undeniably less (lower dollar amounts) than the downstream
sales price. These indisputable facts, coupled with the plain meaning of
the wording of the Wellman royalty provision, should have caused the
Wellman court to reject the plea to adopt a form of a marketable product
rule in lieu of enforcing the royalty provision as written.
s4 Id. at 258.
pp. 12 - 14, supra.
56 Davis v. Hardman, 133 S.E.2d 77, 81 (W. Va. 1963) (emphasis added).
57 Id.
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A critical ::'actor relied upon by the Wellman Court draws in part
upon another part of the Davis opinion. The Wellman Court stated that:
The one-eighth received is commonly referred to as the landowners
royalty. In Davis v. Hardman . . . this Court stated that a "a
distinguish:.ng characteristic of such a royalty interest is that it is
not chargeable with any of the costs of discovery and
production. The Court believes that such a view has been widely
adopted in the United States.58
THs statement tells the reader that for royalty determination
purposes the Wellman Court recognizes "discovery" and "production" as
different activities. The statement also recognizes that the referenced
view which "has been widely adopted in the United States" is specific to
"discovery" and "production" activities. For example, transportation of
gas from the well to a pipeline is neither a discovery nor a production
activity or cost. It is a post-production activity and cost. While the quoted
excerpt from Davis makes clear that the "royalty interest" is not
chargeable with any costs of "discovery" or "production," it makes no
such declaration with respect to transportation or any other post-
production costs.
The Wellman Court reasserts the belief "that such a view has been
widely adopted in the United States." "Such a view" is clearly a
reference to the view that "a royalty interest is not chargeable with any
of the costs of discovery and production." If one defines production as
ending at the well or upon severance of the oil and/or gas at the surface,
the Court is indeed stating "a view which has been widely adopted in the
United States." Since Wellman is a case involving, among other things,
the issue of deductibility of post-production costs from a downstream
sales price for the gas, this portion of the opinion should have
encouraged the Defendant to expect that post-production costs would be
deductible if actually incurred and reasonable in amounts.
At this point in Wellman it appears that the court will not use some
expanded, artificial concept of production to justify denial of deduction
of post-production costs. The thought process by which the Court is
building its opinion is better understood from another opinion excerpt
regarding the a sumed (not established by evidence) motivation of the
defendants:
In spite of ihis, there has been an attempt on the part of oil and gas
producers in recent years to charge the landowner with a pro rata
share of various expenses connected with the operation of an oil and
gas lease such as the expense of transporting oil and gas to a
point of sale, and the expense of treating or altering the oil and
gas so as to put it in a marketable condition. To escape the rule
ss Wellman, 557 S.E. 2d at 263-64 (emphasis added).
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that the lessee must pay the costs of discovery and production,
these expenses have been referred to as 'post-production
expenses.'s"
The question here is from what rule is the Defendant seeking to
"escape." There is no "escape" from the rule "that the lessee must pay
the costs of discovery and production" when the Defendant deducts
"post-production costs," as opposed to costs of discovery and
production, from the downstream sales price. Neither Wellman, Davis
nor any prior West Virginia court opinions characterized the costs the
Wellman Defendant sought to deduct as "discovery" or "production"
costs. From what, if any, established rule of West Virginia law has the
defendant escaped by making the subject deductions from the sales
price? Pre-Wellman, there was no West Virginia rule of law defining
"production" to include the post-production costs at issue in Wellman.
It appears that the court's erroneous.."escape" wording betrays an
underlying pre-disposition on the part of the Court to the view that it is
somehow unfair or wrong for the royalty owner to receive royalty based
upon the price at the mouth of the well rather than on the higher
downstream sales price. It is further likely that that the amount of the
post-production costs involved here struck an equity nerve of the court.
The downstream costs totaled almost 60% of the $2.22 price paid by the
pipeline purchaser to the lessee. The total amount of deductions was
155% of the proceeds at the well used to calculate the royalty. This data
does not necessarily mean that the amounts of post-production costs
deducted from the downstream sales price are unreasonable based upon
any proper evidentiary or other legal standard. However, the Wellman
Court made a not too subtle shift in its analysis to find a justification for
denying some or all of the deductions.
Is the Court actually concluding that it recognizes a different
definition of "production" for interpretation and application of the
royalty provisions than previously adopted by West Virginia courts? Is
the Court actually concluding that the costs the defendant characterizes
as "post-production costs" are instead "production costs?" Is the court
suggesting, without being specific, that costs beyond the well remain
production costs until a marketable product is achieved? None of the
statements cited in Davis or any other pre-Wellman West Virginia cases
provide any basis for a definition of production '"widely adopted in the
United States" which would include as part of "production" the activities
occurring downstream of the mouth of the well.
After discussing with praise several marketable product rule court
opinions,60 the Wellman Court apparently abandoned the distinction
s9 Id. at 264 (emphasis added).
60 Id. at 264-65 citing among others, Garman v. Conoco, 886 P.2d 652 (Colo. 1994);
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between production and post-production costs as a basis for resolving the
deductibility issue, and, without characterizing it as such, the Court
appeared to endorse a poorly articulated broad version of a marketable
product rule. No longer is the key factor what the court describes as the
attempt by defendants to "escape" their royalty obligations by
mischaracterizing as post-production costs, costs which should be
characterized as production costs. Rather, the court concludes that:
In view of all this, this Court concludes that if an oil and gas lease
provides for a royalty based on proceeds received by the lessee,
unless the lease provides otherwise, the lessee must bear all costs
incurred in exploring for, producing, marketing, and
transporti rig the product to the point of sale.
The court':, emphasis on the requirement that the lessee must bear
all costs of "discovery" and "production" has disappeared. Now
marketing and transportation costs are added to the mix. Also, the court
did not state whether the rule it enunciated applied regardless of the point
at which the gas was placed in marketable condition-e.g., at the
wellhead or somewhere downstream of the wellhead.
A fair reading of the somewhat rambling Wellman opinion is that
the court recognized that re-defining "production" to encompass post-
production activities lacked merit. This epiphany led the court to seize
upon the implied marketing covenant as the means of excluding
"marketing" and "transportation" costs from a netback calculation where
one might be permitted.
Prior to the last paragraph in the portion of its opinion dealing with
the post-production cost issues, the court: (i) had appeared to have
concluded that the "proceeds at the mouth of the well" royalty provision
does not provide for the allocation of costs between the lessor and lessee;
(ii) had not found the wording of the royalty provision to be ambiguous;
and (iii) appeared still to be applying a covenant to market concept
essentially the same as the concept adopted by the previously discussed
marketable product rule courts to be used when, in the court's judgment
the wording of the lease does not adequately provide for "allocation" of
costs.
But then, the court ended this portion of the opinion with the
following pronouncement:
Although this Court believes that the language of the leases in the
present case indicating that the "proceeds" shall be from the "sale of
gas as such at the mouth of the well where gas . . . is found" might
Wood v. TXO Production Corp., 854 P.2d 880, 882 (Okla. 1992); Gilmore v. Superior Oil
Co., 388 P.2d 602, 606 (Kan. 1964); Hanna Oil & Gas Co. v. Taylor, 759 S.W.2d 563,
565 (Ark. 1988).
61 Wellman, 55? S.E.2d. at 265 (emphasis added).
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be language indicating that the parties intended that the Wellmans,
as lessors, would bear part of the costs of transporting the gas from
the wellhead to the point of sale, whether that was actually the intent
and the effect of the language of the lease is moot because Energy
Resources, Inc., introduced no evidence whatsoever to show that the
costs were actually incurred or that they were reasonable. In the
absence of such evidence, this Court believes that the trial court
properly granted the Wellmans summary judgment on the cost issue
and that Energy Resources, Inc.'s, claims relating to the court's
actions on this point are without merit. 62
This statement strongly suggests (I believe clearly says) that if the
defendant had offered proper proof of the post-production costs, the
Circuit Court's denial of the defendant's motion for summary judgment
would have been error.
In summary, the Wellman opinion appears to stand for three
principles. The first is that:
... this Court concludes that if an oil and gas lease provides for a
royalty based on proceeds by the lessee, unless the lease provides
otherwise, the lessee must bear all costs incurred in exploring for,
producing, marketing, and transporting the product to the point of
sale.63
The second is that the "at the mouth of the well" wording in the
lease might indicate that the parties to the lease intended that the lessors
would bear part of the costs of transporting the gas from the wellhead to
the point of the sale. And the third is that the failure of the producer
Defendant to introduce evidence to show that the costs were actually
incurred or that they were reasonable renders moot "whether that was
actually the intent and the effect of the language of the lease."
Because of the equivocation of the Supreme Court in Wellman, I
refer to the decision as the "Wellman judicial stutter."
VI. The Tawney Decision
A. The "Second Shoe Falls"
The gestation period for a bad legal doctrine varies greatly
depending upon the circumstances. The gestation period for the more
clearly defined current rule of law in West Virginia on allocation of post-
production costs under proceeds "at the well" and "at the mouth of the
well" leases where the gas is sold by the defendant downstream of the
well was almost exactly five (5) years. Wellman was decided on July 6,
2001. Tawney was decided on June 15, 2006. Whether Tawney is the
62 Id. at 265 (emphasis added).
63 Id. (emphasis added).
6 Id. at 265.
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final word on post-production costs in West Virginia is uncertain at this
time. Indeed, the Tawney case is currently on appeal to the West Virginia
Supreme Couit following remand in the 2006 decision.
B. Certified Question as Reformulated by the Tawney Court
Tawney is a class action, with over 8,000 Plaintiffs and with 2,258
leases containing various lease forms.65 At least 1,382 of the leases have
language indicating that the royalties are to be calculated "at the
well," "at the wellhead," "net of all costs beyond the wellhead," or
"less all taxes, assessments, and adjustments." 66 The Defendant moved
for summary judgment only with respect to the royalty clauses which are
67 Ciciidentified in the- Court's reformulated certified question. The Circuit
Court denied the Defendant's motion for summary judgment.
As statec earlier, the Supreme Court's opinion is based upon the
following single question:
In light of the fact that West Virginia recognizes that a lessee to an
oil and gas lease must bear all costs incurred in marketing and
transporting the product to the point of sale unless the oil and gas
lease provides otherwise, is lease language that provides that the
lessor's 1/8 royalty is to be calculated "at the well," "at the
wellhead" or similar language, or that the royalty is "an amount
equal to 1/8 of the price, net all costs beyond the "wellhead," or
"less all taxes, assessments, and adjustments" sufficient to indicate
that the lessee may deduct post-production expenses from the
lessor's 1/8 royalty, presuming that such expenses are reasonable
and actually incurred?68
C. Summary of Parties' Positions
1. Plaintiffs' Positions
The Tainey plaintiffs' primary complaint is that following
Wellman, the Colorado Supreme Court's 2001 decision in Rogers and
other marketable product rules decisions, the court should reject all
post-production cost deductions incurred prior to placing the gas in a
"marketable condition."7 o Plaintiffs contend that the gas was not in
marketable condition until it was sold to the downstream purchasers.
65 Tawney v. Columbia Natural Resources, L.L. C., 633 S.E.2d 22, 25 (W.Va. 2006).
66 Id.
67 Id. at n. 2.
68 Id.
69 See supra cases cited at note 60.
70 Tawnev, 633 S.E.2d at 26 citing Syl. pt. 4 of Wellman, 557 S.E.2d 254 (W. Va.
2001); see also Plaintiffs' Brief in Support of Affirming Trial Court's Rulings on
Certified Questions at 10-30 (filed Jan. 27, 2006). ("Plaintiffs' Brief").
71 Plaintiffs' Brief at 30.
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Plaintiffs further contend that the wording in the leases is ambiguous,
that the court should apply an implied covenant to market the gas, that
the court should follow the reasoning in the Rogers case and that all
ambiguous terms should be strictly construed against the defendant. 72
Alternatively, plaintiffs challenge many or most of the costs deducted by
the defendant as inappropriate types to be deducted, and/or that the
amounts of the deductions as excessive.73
In their briefing, plaintiffs list twenty-three (23) types of charges
which they say the defendant includes in what defendant characterizes as
an "across-the-board postage stamp" rate, and which are deducted on a
unit basis from all royalty payments.74 These charges include, among
others, operating costs, return on investment, cost of royalty payments to
owners, operating and maintenance expenses for gathering facilities and
line losses usually attributable to line leaks. According to plaintiffs, the
defendant admitted that it pays all royalties from the pool of gas from
multiple sources on the same basis regardless of the wording of the
royalty provisions.76 It appears that this fact was a major factor in the
court's decision to certify the class, despite the large number of leases
(with many different royalty provisions) at issue. Plaintiffs assert that
such a practice shows that the defendant was not actually relying upon or
applying the specific lease provisions.
According to plaintiffs, prior to 1993 the defendant did not make
any of these deductions.78 Plaintiffs point to evidence that the decision to
begin the deductions in 1993 was made after serious debate within the
company regarding its right to make the deductions. If the wording in
the leases so clearly permits the deductions, why, ask the plaintiffs, did
the defendant not begin making the deductions earlier?80 Why the need
for internal debate over the decision whether to commence the
deductions in 1993 if the terms of the royalty provision unambiguously
give the defendant the right to make the deductions?8' The obvious
answers to all of these questions, according to the plaintiffs, is that the
72 Id. at 10-30.
7 See Petitioner/Plaintiffs' Reply Brief Regarding Certified Questions at 42-43 (Filed
Mar. 31, 2006) ("Plaintiffs' Reply Brief').
74 See Plaintiffs' Brief at 1-3.
75 Id.
76 Id. at 3.
7 Id. at 3-4.
78 Plaintiffs' Reply Brief at 9.
79 Id.at1.
s See id.
I See id.
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deductions were not permitted under the leases and the defendant knew
that they weren:ot permitted.
Plaintiffs also complained that the defendant made "intra-sales" to
sister companie-s, failed to pay for constituents extracted from the gas,
made forward sales to offshore companies, experienced excessive line
loss and sent monthly statements to the plaintiffs stating affirmatively
that there were. "0" deductions from their royalty and represented that
defendants received an amount certain for their gas.82 The plaintiffs'
argued that "[t]his figure was false."
While the Supreme Court did not analyze or decide any of the issues
mentioned in the prior paragraph, it is quite possible that concerns on the
part of the court regarding these issues, might have contributed to the
court's decision on the wording required in a lease to provide adequate
instruction to permit the lessee to make deductions from the sales price
for post-production costs.
The plaintiffs insisted that if the defendant wished to make the post-
production costs deductions it would have been very easy to specify that
right with a properly worded royalty provision. The provision could
have identified the specific types of costs to be deducted, and how the
amounts of the costs were to be determined, along with the specific
location at which the royalty payments were to be calculated.ss Plaintiffs
complained that wording like "at the well," "at the wellhead" and/or "net
proceeds at the well" failed to provide enough details on royalty
calculations to permit the deductions.
2. Defendant's Positions
The defen lant expressed its plea for relief from the Supreme Court,
in part, as follows:
CNR now asks this Court to reverse the trial court on the basis that
the "deductibility" language in the leases is clear and unambiguous
and, as E. matter of law, those leases which contain express
deductibility language allow the lessee to deduct the royalty owners'
proportioiate share of post-production expenses, provided CNR
can prove as if in an action for an accounting that such expenses
are actual and reasonable.
82 See Plaintiff;' Reply Brief at 43.
83 Id.
84 See id. at 13- 14.
8 See id. at 11.
86 See id. at 13-18.
8 Brief of Def :ndant Columbia Natural Resources, L.L.C. On Certified Questions at
4 (Filed Mar. 17, 2006) ("Defendant's Brief) citing Wellman, 557 S.E.2d at 265.
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(emphasis added). The highlighted wording is obviously an invocation of
the portion of the Wellman opinion which certainly appears to justify
defendant's request.
While the defendant offered numerous criticisms of plaintiffs' legal
and factual assertions, the following examples suffice for purposes of
this analysis of the Tawney opinion.
1. Plaintiffs' legal position reads out of the leases the "at the
well," "at the wellhead" and similar wording, in contravention of
applicable rules of contract construction 8 This language explicitly
provides that the point of valuation for the gas royalty determination
purposes is at the well, not at a downstream delivery and sales location.
2. The royalty provisions at issue are unambiguous, they clearly
provide for royalty valuation "at the well" or "at the wellhead" and,
thereby, for the allocation of post-production costs between the lessor
and lessee. The court should not import into the contract any implied
covenant to market the gas.90
3. Numerous of the lessors under leases at issue are sophisticated
contracting parties and the "construe the lease against the lessee"
doctrine has no application to such leases.9'
4. The gas is marketable once it enters the gathering system, but
some of the gas is not in a condition to be delivered to major interstate
pipelines without processing.92
5. It is a common practice to collect gas athered from numerous
wells in rural West Virginia into "pools" of gas.9
6. The Tawney defendant pays royalties based upon the weighted
average sales price of gas for gas sales from the relevant pool. This too is
a common practice in West Virginia.94
7. Starting with the weighted average price of gas sold from the
pool, the Defendant deducts from the weighted average pool costs
"incurred between the relevant pool and the wellhead for gathering,
processing, compression and line loss in order to compute the net
proceeds price at the well."
88 See id. at 26-28.
89 Id. at 3.
90 Id. at 19-21.
91 Id. at 6.
92 Id. at 7.
9 Id. at 7-9.
9 Id. at 8.
9 Id. at 9.
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8. Citing Wellman, the lessee argues that if it presents proper
proof of the reasonableness of the subject post-production costs, the
Court should hold, as a matter of law, that the royalty provisions at issue
"allow the lessee to deduct the royalty owners' proportionate share of
post-production expenses ... "
9. The ci:cuit court's adoption of the Rogers decision "is a radical
departure from existing law in West Virginia as to the deduction of post-
production expenses and, as acknowledged by the circuit court,
constitutes the adoption of a minority rule which has been roundly
criticized by legal scholars throughout the country."97
10. Alternatively, if the lease language is ambiguous, the lessee
should be given the opportunity to present proof of the intention of the
parties.98 The interpretation tool of construing the lease language against
the lessee is ono of last resort.99 Thus, defendant lessee should first be
afforded the opportunity to have the intent of the leases determined by a
fact-finder.100
D. Amicus Curiae Briefs
One unusual feature of the oil and gas business in West Virginia
appears to be that the post-production costs can be very high due to
rough terrain, th e distance of many wells from the point of sale and other
factors. This oftm results in high post-production costs in relation to the
at the well price of natural gas. Recall that in Wellman the downstream
sales price was $2.24 and the at the well price was $0.87. The Tawney
plaintiffs also complained about the amounts of the post-production
costs.
Because of the importance of the post-production costs issues to the
oil and gas industry and to royalty owners in West Virginia, two industry
groups filed amicus curiae briefs. The amicii are The Independent Oil
and Gas Association of West Virginia, Inc. ("IOGA") and the West
Virginia Oil and Natural Gas Association ("WVONGA"). The combined
input of the two amicii added considerably to the authorities and
arguments offered in support of the Defendant.
The WVONGA brief emphasizes, inter alia, the:
strong public policy concerns [which] favor reading "at the
wellhead" and similar language as allocating post-production costs
between a lessor and lessee. These concerns range from a reduction
in supply of natural gas to higher gas prices for consumers. This is a
9 Id. at 4.
97 Id.
98 Id. at 21.
9 Id.
" Id. at 22.
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far-reaching consequence of the attempts to provide oil and gas
lessors with undeserved windfalls.'0 '
An incomplete summary of the "strong public concerns" discussed
by WVONGA follows:
a. The royalty owner gets a windfall when the at the well
valuation point is rejected by the courts.' 02
b. Failure to enforce the "at the wellhead" valuation to allocate
downstream costs means that defendants will be required to pay lessors
the same amount for gas royalties whether or not that gas was suitable
for sale at the wellhead. 03
c. When post-production costs are not shared, a lessor receives
the same amount in royalties for gas containing high levels of hydrogen
sulfide as for sweet gas.'" Yet to be able to sell the gas containing
hydrogen sulfide, the defendant must make additional post-production
investments to treat the gas. These additional costs can be very high.
d. There might be less production of natural gas in West Virginia
as a result of the lack of sharing the post-production costs. 05
e. Requiring royalties on post-production costs might encourage
inefficient markets, with defendants having an incentive to sell the
production at the wellhead to purchasers who will conduct the post-
production activities.'0 6 Such practices could have the dual effects of
lowering royalty payments and increasing prices to consumers.
One other concern expressed by WVONGA encapsulates numerous
elements already discussed in this presentation.
First, these approaches would move free market transactions
between lessors and lessees "away from property and contract law
principles toward regulation." David W. Hardymon, "Adrift on the
Implied Covenant to Market: Regulation By Implication," 24
Energy & Min. L. Instit., n. 12 (2004). The intentions of the parties
embodied in gas leases would be subverted, after the fact, by an
artificial judicial construct - a vastly expanded notion of the
implied duty of a lessee with regard to the gas extracted from leased
property. Instead of giving force to agreements reached in a market
environment, the courts adopting this approach in effect are
regulating those transactions in accordance with their own
1o Brief of Amicus Curiae, West Virginia Oil and Natural Gas Association, In Support
of Columbia Natural Resources at 17 (Filed Mar. 17, 2006) ("WVONGA Brief').
"o2 Id. at 18.
103 Id. at 18
104 Id.
105 Id.
" Id. at 19.
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conception of what constitutes a desirable result. However, the
courts have no mandate to impose such regulation.o
The quoted paragraph addresses the concern about discarding the
entire "at the well" type royalty provision and replacing it with the
court's own judgment on what the parties should have intended in
executing the leases. Such a danger in contract interpretation can cut
against either paity (or sometimes both) depending upon the perspective
and preference of the court. It is at this juncture that the court's decision
takes on more of the quality of legislation than a reasoned opinion based
upon sound legal principles.
The IOGA brief addresses some of the same points as the
WVONGA brief and those will not be repeated here. IOGA provided to
the court detailcd legal analysis of the issue before the court, with
extensive citations to legal and regulatory authorities and the history of
federal government regulation of the wellhead gas pricing. 08 IOGA
offers four (4) "a3signments of error":
1. The circuit court erred when it casually lumped all of the lease
language found in Exhibit A attached to the circuit court's order of
certification into a single category of "leases under which there is no
express language or provision allowing the lessee to deduct" post-
production expenses. 9
2. The circuit court erred when it ruled that leases that contain "at
the well" or "at the wellhead" language do not clearly and
unambiguously contemplate the deduction of post-production
expenses."10
3. The circuit court erred when it adopted the extreme minority
rule from Colorado that gas is not marketable until it is delivered to
a market location."'
4. The circuit court erred when it failed to rule that Appalachian
gas is in marketable condition at the well."12
IOGA traced the history of federal regulation of wellhead gas prices
demonstratini that the term "wellhead" had a clear meaning under the
regulations." IOGA pointed out that for over 50 years the Federal
Power Commiss ion ("FPC"), Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
107 Id. at 20.
los See Amicus Curiae Brief on Behalf of the Independent Oil and Gas Association of
West Virginia, Inc. (Filed Mar. 17, 2006) ("IOGA Brief").
'"' Id. at 3-4.
"o Id. at 4.
II' Id.
112 id
"' Id. at 5-7.
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("FERC"), the United States Congress and the United States Supreme
Court have been interpreting and giving specific meaning to the term
"wellhead."" 4 IOGA criticized the circuit court for giving no meanings
to the terms "gross" and "net" found in some of the royalty provisions."s
IOGA urges that "[i]t is simply erroneous for the circuit court to ascribe
no meaning to these words.'
Another argument presented by IOGA is that acceptance of the
circuit court's decision is contrary to a long history of settled law in West
Virginia which has given effect to the "at the wellhead," "at the well,"
and similar language.' 7 Appealing to the State Supreme Court to
recognize the importance of certainty in commercial transactions based
upon long standing legal principles, IOGA concludes that:
IOGA submits, based on the arguments and history contained
herein, that it is the plaintiffs in this case who are attempting what
amounts to an assault on the status quo, and, if the circuit court's
rulings on the certified questions is allowed to stand, the number of
natural resource leases that would be unsettled in West Virginia
would be enormous, not just for natural gas, but for all minerals.
Even for coal leases, would the language "at the mine" or "at the
mine mouth" in a coal lease be similarly meaningless? If a coal
lease provides "net of all costs to market," is that language
meaningless? What about the term "FOB mine"--does that not
specify who pays the transportation costs?"
The WVONGA and IOGA briefs demonstrate the importance of the
decision ultimately made by the Tawney Court to interested West
Virginians. One must assume that the West Virginia Supreme Court
understood the importance of its decision. When referring to the amicii
briefs, the court stated:
At this point we wish to acknowledge the valuable contributions of
Amici Curiae Independent Oil and Gas Association of West
Virginia, Inc. and West Virginia Oil and Natural Gas Association
who filed briefs in support of the position advanced by Columbia
Natural Resources."' 9
Both amicii briefs contain substantial substantive analysis, and one
who wants to fully understand the analyses and arguments "on the table"
when the state Supreme Court decided Tawney will be well served to
"i4 Id. at 8.
us Id.
116 Id. at 9.
"' Id. at 17-18.
"ts Id. at 21-22.
119 Tawniey, 633 S.E.2d at 25 n. 3.
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read the amicii briefs, along with the briefs filed by the parties.120
Additionally, I believe that it is important to know that the West Virginia
Supreme Court dcided the Tawney case as it did despite the extensive
education on the basic economics of oil and gas operations in West
Virginia. The Amicci briefing made clear the potential adverse impact on
the economics of the type of rule of law adopted by the court. The
court's decision to declare the "at the well" type wording as ambiguous
and to substitute therefor an implied marketing covenant as the Court did
i a strong reason :for courts to enforce the contracts as written.
E. The Court's Opinion
In its recitation of the facts the Court stated that:
"At least since 1993, CNR [Defendant] has taken deductions from
Plaintiffs' 1/E royalty for 'post-production' costs."'21
Two aspects of this statement bode ill for the defendant. The first is
the assumption, without yet having provided any analysis of the "at the
well" type provisions, that post-production costs are deducted "from
Plaintiffs' 1/8 royalty." As discussed earlier, this is an erroneous
statement of the nature of the royalty interest.122 And, when stated as here
by the court, that erroneous statement itself creates ambiguity, and a false
sense of inequity regarding the amount of money paid to the royalty
owner.
The second r egative is the use of quotes around the words "post-
production." The opinion does not reflect any determination that any of
the costs at issue were other than post-production costs. Use of the
quotes appears to indicate at least some hostility of the Court towards the
positions taken by the defendant. Recall that in Wellman the Court used
quotes around the words "post-production expenses" in the same
paragraph in which it spoke of the attempt of defendants to "escape"
their royalty obligations. 23
The Tawney court eliminated the "judicial stutter" in Wellman that
royalty provision wording of the type addressed in Wellman (and in
Tawney) might provide an adequate basis for allocation of post-
production costs if the defendant introduces evidence to show that it
actually incurred the costs and that they are reasonable.124 When counsel
for the defendant urged this language from the court's opinion in
Wellman, the court responded that it did not decide in Wellman whether
120 The cites for retrieval of- all of these briefs are listed on Appendix "A," the
bibliography.
121 Tawney, 633 S.E.2d at 25 (emphasis added).
122 See supra Section II.B.
123 Wellman, 557 S.E.2d at 264.
124 Tawney, 633 S.E 2d at 29.
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"at the well" type language is or is not ambiguous. 125 The court found no
merit whatsoever to the defendant's reliance on the court's language in
Wellman.'26
What happened between the court's 2001 decision in Wellman and
the 2006 opinion in Tawney to convince the court that the "at the well,"
"at the wellhead" and similar wording is ambiguous, and that the court
should ignore such wording and look elsewhere for instruction regarding
the proper royalty calculation method(s)? The Tawney court did not cite
a single opinion from any West Virginia court decided after Wellman
which declared the lease language at issue in Wellman or in Tawney to be
ambiguous. The West Virginia rules of contract construction did not
change between Wellman and Tawney. The meaning of the term
"production" did not change between Wellman and Tawney, such that
one would have expected the ambiguity holding in Tawney. In Wellman,
the court expressed its suspicion or belief that the defendants were
mischaracterizing production and post-production costs, yet there was no
holding of ambiguity by the Wellman court.127 The Tawney court
repeated the same suspicion or belief that defendants were
mischaracterizing "post-production costs."' 28
Something very significant did happen between July 6, 2001, when
the court decided Wellman, and the decision in Tawney. On August 27,
2001 the Colorado Supreme Court decided the Rogers case as modified
on denial of rehearing.129 Rogers also dealt, among other things, with
whether the "at the well" and "at the mouth of the well" wording was
sufficient to determine the proper allocation of costs between the parties
of "post-production expenses of gathering, compressing, and dehydrating
the gas prior to its entry into the interstate pipeline."' 30 However, Rogers
did not shed any light on the Tawney court's decision that the "at the
well" and similar wording involved in Wellman and Tawney is
ambiguous. Indeed, at page 4 of its Tawney opinion, the court explained
that:
The Rogers court did not hinge its decision on a finding that "at the
well" language was ambiguous. Instead, the court found such
language to be completely silent with respect to allocation of
costs. 131
125 Id.
126 Id.
127 Wellman, 557 S.E.2d at 264-66.
128 Tawney, 633 S.E.2d at 27.
129 A listing of only a few of the journal articles about Rogers is included in the
bibliography, Appendix "A."
130 Rogers v. Westerman Farm Co., 29 P.3d 887, 896 (Colo. 2001).
'1 Tawney, 633 S.E.2d at 27 (emphasis added).
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In Rogers, the post-production costs issue arose out of leases which
provided ". . . with some variation, for royalties to be paid based on the
gas 'at the well' or 'at the mouth of the well'." 32 Some of the gas was
sold at the well and some of the gas was sold downstream of the well. 33
Part of the dispute was whether these royalty provisions are "sufficiently
clear to set forth ihe proper allocation between the parties of the costs of
gathering, compressing, and dehydrating the gas prior to its entry into the
interstate pipeline."l 34
For gas sold downstream of the well, lessors argued that the
defendants breached the royalty obligations by deducting from the
downstream gas prices costs for gathering, compression, and
dehydration.'3 5 The lessors argued further that these costs were necessary
to "place the gas in marketable condition" and that the defendants must
bear all of those costs.' 36 The defendant contended, among other things,
that the gas was marketable at the well, that these expenses served to
increase the value of already marketable gas and that the "at the well"
provisions allocate-d these costs between the lessor and the defendant. 3 7
After detailed discussion of the "at the well" royalty provisions, the
Rogers court held that the lease language was "silent" with regard to
allocation of post- production costs.' 3 8 The court concluded that "because
the leases are silent, we must look to the implied covenant to market and
our previous decision in Garman v. Conoco to determine the proper
allocation of costs."l39
The Rogers court further held that under the implied covenant to
market, the defer dant has a duty to make the gas marketable.14 0 The
defendant must bear all costs until the gas is in marketable condition.141
Thus, the determination of when gas is "marketable" is critical to any
allocation of costs between the lessor and lessee.
The lessors contended that the sales of gas made at the well were
rot arms-length transactions by the lessees.' 2 The lessors also argued
"that the purchasers of the gas at the well, who subsequently sold the gas
D2 Rogers, 29 P.3d at 891.
1:13 Id
1:14 Id
115 Id. at 893-94.
1 6 Id. at 894.
B7 Id.
Id. at 900.
'9 Id. at 902.
14O Id. at 902.
141 See id.
142 Id. at 893.
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downstream at the interstate pipeline for a higher price, were closely
linked with the lessees."143 These transactions, according to the lessor
resulted in a breach of the lease.'" The defendant argued that the gas was
marketable at the well.145 The royalties were calculated using the gross
proceeds received by the defendant at the well.146
For gas sold downstream of the well the defendant paid royalties
based upon the sales price minus deductions for gathering, compression
and dehydration.147 The lessors countered, arguing that the gathering,
compression and dehydration costs were necessarily incurred to make the
gas marketable and there should be no deductions from the downstream
sales price.148
Among the holdings of the Rogers court are the following:
1. The "at the well" language is silent with respect to allocation of
the costs.149
2. Given the silence, "we must look to the implied covenant to
market," and thus, whether the gas is marketable.' 5
3. If gas is marketable at the well, transportation costs may be
shared between the lessor and lessee.' 5'
4. If the gas is not marketable at the well "either because it is not
in a marketable condition, or because it is not acceptable for a
commercial market, then the lessee has not met its burden of
making the gas marketable." In that situation the lessee is not
entitled to deduct transportation costs.152
5. "... the more accurate definition of marketability includes both
a reference to a physical condition of the gas, as well as the ability
for the gas to be sold in a commercial market place." 53
6. "It is submitted that acts which constitute production have
not ceased until a marketable product has been obtained. After a
marketable product has been obtained, then further costs in
improving or transporting such product should be shared by the
143 Id.
144 Id.
145 Id. at 894.
146 Id.
147 Id.
148 Id. at 893-94.
149 Id. at 902.
150 Id
151 Id. at 900.
152 id
153 Id. at 903.
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lessor and lessee if royalty gas is delivered in kind, or such costs
should be taken into account in determining market value if royalty
is paid in roney."' 5 4
7. Gas is marketable when it is in the physical condition such that
it is acceptable to be bought and sold in a commercial marketplace,
and in the location of a commercial marketplace, such that it is
commercia'.ly saleable in the oil and gas marketplace.'ss
8. Thus, the lessee bears the costs incurred in getting the gas in
it 'rketable condition. 56
The Rogers approach totally ignores the "at the well" language,
expands the concept of "production" beyond any rational description of
this longstanding understanding in the oil and gas industry and applied
consistently in state and federal courts (i.e., production ends with
severance of the- gas), relies upon an overly broad articulation of an
implied marketing covenant, and combines the quality of the physical
condition of the gas with placement of the gas in the market in which it is
sold in determining when the gas is marketable. Some commentators
describe this approach as the most extreme position yet taken by the
supreme court of any state.'"s While true that it is an extreme position,
the more loosely worded Tawney opinion, and its extremely detailed
suggested wording of a royalty clause which would be adequate to
allocate the po it-production costs might be more extreme than the
Rogers decision.
The Tawne' court endorsed the Rogers court's SILENCE excuse
for relying upon the implied covenant to market to provide the
controlling term:; between the parties.'58 The Tawney court also cites the
Rogers holdings that:
a. the im "lied covenant to market the gas governs the allocation
of costs;'59 and
b. under the implied covenant to market the gas, the lessee alone
must bear the expenses necessary to make the gas marketable, when
the gas is not marketable at the physical location of the well.16 0
Earlier in t.e presentation I questioned the accuracy of the assertion
by some that the Tawney court relied upon "settled" West Virginia law in
14 Id. at 905 (emphasis added).
1SS Id
s5 Id. at 906.
15 See Keeling a id Gillespie supra note 5 at 74 citing Owen L. Anderson, 2001: A
Royalty Odyssey, 53 INsT. ON OIL & GAs L. & TAX'N § 4.03, at 14-15.
1 Tawney, 633 S.E.2d at 27.
159 Id.
160 Id.
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formulating its opinion. The question was prompted by the following
statement in the opinion:
This Court finds it unnecessary to adopt wholesale the reasoning of
either of the Courts above [Oklahoma, Texas, Colorado and
Michigan] in answering the question before us. Instead we simply
look to our settled law.6
Contrary to the highlighted statement, prior to Tawney it was not
settled law that the "at the well" and "at the wellhead" type leases were
ambiguous, silent regarding post-production costs and/or that they failed
to effectively address the allocation of post-production costs.
Returning to Wellman we know that the "judicial stutter" left the
door open for the supreme court to hold that these royalty provisions
were in all respects adequate as written to allocate the costs between the
lessors and the lessee, if the lessee presents appropriate evidence
establishing that it incurred the costs and'that the costs are reasonable.
Prior to Wellman these terms had not been declared by the West Virginia
courts to be ambiguous, silent or lacking in sufficient detail to allocate
post-production costs. The Wellman court did not declare the "at the
well" royalty provisions to be ambiguous, silent or inherently inadequate
to deal with post-production cost issues.
What about the implied covenant to market? Prior to Tawney, was
West Virginia law "settled" that the implied marketing covenant was so
broad that it controlled the allocation of post-production costs in a
manner similar to the covenant as interpreted and applied by the Rogers
court? The only West Virginia opinion which it appears that the Tawney
Court cited as authority on the covenant to market is the Wellman case.
However, given the "judicial stutter" in Wellman, Wellman does not
qualify as "settled law" on any aspect of the opinion, including the
implied covenant to market, if a lessee presents proper evidence of the
costs actually incurred and which are reasonable.
How might one explain the court's choice of words in describing the
source ("our settled law") of its extremely broad ruling with respect to
the allocation of costs under the leases at issue in Tawney? I offer the
following potential explanations.
First, the court was faced with explaining its decision in the face of
the "judicial stutter" in Wellman. To the extent that the new decision is
viewed as a continuation of prior settled legal principles, the less
dramatic the appearance of change in the court's position as between
Wellman and Tawney.
Second, the amicii briefs placed the court in a somewhat defensive
position, especially when the pleas in those briefs are combined with the
- 274 -
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extensive criticism of Rogers and similar pre-Tawney decisions
expressed by courts in other jurisdictions and commentators. The court
appeared to take great care not to say or suggest that it actually adopted
Rogers or any other specific case.
Third, it is my opinion that the court, in effect, "backed into" this
opinion after first concluding that it would be unfair to the royalty
owners to permit the defendant to pay the royalties on the price of the gas
at the well. At that point, the court used the declarations of silence and
ambiginity, which enabled it to impose a version of a covenant to market
to prohibit the diductions in most circumstances. Taking great comfort in
the contract interpretation rule that ambiguities are construed against the
lessee, the court was finished. There was no need to further antagonize
lessees and the oil and gas producers by declaring that the court adopted
the marketable product rule as it exists in Rogers or any other case.
After eviscerating the "at the well" type leases before it, the court
offered the following suggestions for drafting a royalty provision which
would pass musler under Tawney to permit the lessee to make deductions
from the downstream sales price to get a Royalty Price or Royalty Value
(to be multiplied by the royalty fraction or percentage to determine the
royalty amount).
[L]anguage in an oil and gas lease that is intended to allocate
between the lessor and the lessee the costs of marketing the product
and transpcrting it to the point of sale must expressly provide that
the lessor hall bear some part of the costs incurred between the
wellhead and the point of sale, identify with the particularity the
specific deductions the lessee intends to take from the lessor's
royalty (usually 1/8), and indicate the method of calculating the
amount to be deducted from the royalty for such post-production
costs.'
Given the vintage and large number of outstanding "at the well"
type leases in West Virginia, and in the absence of modification of the
Tawney decision, Tawney will continue to dominate post-production cost
issues for many years into the future. It will likely be a long time before
new forms of leases written with the guidance provided in the above-
quoted suggestions from the court will be producing and under which
royalties will be paid.
VII. Conclusion
The skepticism and criticism expressed in this paper are not in any
way personal attacks on any of the members of the West Virginia
Supreme Court or of the members of the other courts which have, in my
opinion, gone too far in altering the bargains reflected in the "at the well"
162 Id. at 30.
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and "at the mouth of the well" type royalty provisions involved in the
relevant litigation. Words really do mean something, especially when
used for over 100 years (in many instances) with generally accepted
meanings in the oil and gas industry in the context of royalty
determinations. Tawney is, unfortunately, a "poster child" for tampering
too much with legal concepts that have served royalty owners and lessees
well for extremely long periods of time.
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